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Although the 2004 enlargement adds some 70 million inhabitants to the EU
population, which was about 370 million before, and in spite of the very signifi-
cant gap in average incomes between old and new members, the latter being much
poorer, the size of the EU budget will hardly increase, by a mere 15% till the end
of the current programming period, in 2006. With the opening of a new round
of negotiations over the next multi-annual financial perspectives for the period
2007-2013, in a context of slow growth, competing objectives and tight financial
situations in most EU15 member states, the future size and composition of the
European budget are open to debate and the choices that have to be made will,
to a large extent, shape the future of the common policies and of the existing
instruments of financial solidarity, with likely consequences on economic growth and
its distribution amongst member states.
This paper presents and discusses the main proposals that have been put
forward at the initial stage of this negotiation. It then extends the analysis to
broader considerations about common policies, most notably the Common agricul-
tural policy (CAP) and the structural and regional policies, and collective goods for
the EU, and about the various institutional and budgetary arrangements, as well
as sources of financing, that may be contemplated to implement European policies
or to achieve common objectives by means of a more decentralized budgetary
system. It also discusses the delicate issue of net contributions and analyzes the
pros and cons of various alternative sources of financing for the EU budget,
including a European tax. 
JEL classifications: H87, Q18
W ill the new climate following the changes of governments inSpain and Poland in March 2004 speed the adoption of aEuropean Constitution up and ease the negotiations over the
European budget? Occurring only months after the decision, finalized
in Thessalonica, to welcome 10 new members in the European Union
(EU), the failure, in December 2003, to adopt the constitutional treaty
that had been elaborated by the European Convention chaired by Valéry
Giscard d’Estaing has had immediate consequences in many fields of
the functioning of the EU, including the budgetary negotiations that are
due in the coming months to decide on the new medium-term financial
perspectives that are to follow the current “Agenda 2000” running until
2006, covering the period 2007-2013.
But how costly will the new enlargement be, and will the next ones–
with the already decided adhesions of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007
and the possible joining of others, such as Macedonia, other Balkan
countries, and possibly Turkey– add to the financial burden of richer,
more ancient members? As is well known, new members are markedly
less developed than the 15 older members, which makes the negotia-
tions more difficult, especially in times of bad overall economic
performance and very tight budget conditions in most member states.
Instead of reasoning on common goals and appropriate tools to reach
them, the new negotiations over the size and structure of the EU
budget that is to prevail well into the next decade are dominated by a
petty accounting logic and by the concern of major current contrib-
utors to minimize their net financial “burdens” and get closer to the
“juste retour” once advocated by former British Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher in the early 1980s.
This paper is an attempt to analyze the stakes surrounding the EU
budget in the context of the present and likely future enlargements.
The first section briefly presents the structure of the current EU budget,
and discusses the distributional issues that dominate the debates over
its future. Section 2 summarizes some of the major controversies
surrounding the two common policies that currently account for almost
80% of the EU budget expenditures, namely the Common Agricultural
Policy (CAP) and the regional and structural policies; it also discusses
some of the proposals that have recently been put forward to reform
these policies, most notably the so-called Sapir report (Sapir et alii,
2003) and the programmatic document of the EU Commission (EU
Commission, 2004). In section 3, we sketch an alternative way of
assessing budgetary prospects and choices, by emphasizing the logic of
common objectives and policy choices. Section 4 deals with the issue
of financial resources and discusses the possibility of introducing a
European tax. Finally, section 5 offers some concluding remarks about
the prospects of European budgetary negotiations.
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1. The accounting logic and the “juste retour”
Whereas the initial objective of the multi-annual budgetary
programming in the EU, first implemented in 1988 under the Delors
presidency, was mostly to enhance the quality and efficiency of common
intervention tools by explicitly reasoning in a medium-term framework,
it has, in practice, and especially in the latest two negotiation rounds
over the EU budget, led to overemphasizing the financial and distribu-
tional dimensions of issues and policy choices involved, at the expense
of substance and goals. With the adoption of an overall ceiling on total
expenditures– currently at 1.24% of EU GNI– and in a context of poor
economic growth performance and tight budget constraints at the
national level, the “accounting logic” that prevailed in the drafting and
adoption of the previous multi-annual budget package– the so-called
“Agenda 2000”, covering the period from 2000 to 2006– adopted in
Berlin in March 1999 (Fayolle and Le Cacheux, 1999) is once again
likely to dominate the upcoming negotiation round, as clearly demon-
strated by the positions taken at the beginning of 2004 by major actors. 
1.1. The structure of the EU budget in the aftermath
of the enlargement
Amounting to a little less than €100 billion in 2003 and due to rise
to only €115 billion in 2006, the European budget is both small, relative
to national or even, some local budgets, and highly tilted towards two
major expenditure items: the Common agricultural policy (CAP) eats
up about €45 billion, and structural and regional policies about €33
billion. While the former has been considerably trimmed over the past
ten years, in the process of adapting EU agriculture to the rules of
world trade and of reducing public support to production prices and
farmers’ incomes, structural policies have progressively emerged as the
major financial instrument for promoting economic convergence and
social and spatial cohesion amongst EU countries and regions. With
their low income per capita and, for many of them, relatively large and
backward agricultural sectors, the new member states would, in the
absence of any change in the rules for distributing EU funds, have been
important beneficiaries on both accounts.
On the receipt side, the traditional “own resources” of the EU
budget– import duties– now amount to very little (about 12.5% of total
resources in 2003), and the two major components are the VAT
resource (about 25%) and, now predominantly, the GDP contribution
(approximately 60%), both calculated on the basis of each member
state’s current activity and mostly proportional, so that it is relatively
easy to impute expenditures to each member state and assess the net
gain or contribution of each participant. Given their initially low per
NEGOTIATING THE MEDIUM-TERM FINANCIAL PERSPECTIVES
177
Special issue/April 2004
capita GDP and incomes, the new members will all be net beneficiaries
in the immediate aftermath of their adhesion. However, depending
upon the choices made for the next financial perspectives, some of
them may soon become net contributors.
1.2. Net contributors and the Commission: two proposals
Although the mere idea of calculating net gains and losses may seem
contrary to the spirit of European integration and the notion of financial
solidarity that goes with it, it has become a habit to start all budgetary
negotiations in the EU with an assessment of net financial gains and
losses of each member state, and indeed to reason almost exclusively
in these terms even in the course of the negotiation (see, for instance,
Gaillard and Sutour, 2004). Such calculations are made possible by the
specific structure of both expenditures and resources: the national
distribution of each item is easily assessed, hence net overall gains or
losses too. And given that expenditures are dominated by the CAP and
structural policies, both heavily tilted towards a handful of countries,
the distribution of net gains and losses is itself quite unbalanced: in
2003, the spontaneous working of EU budgetary rules on spending and
financing would have left the United Kingdom (UK) with a net contri-
bution of almost €9 billion, Germany a little over €5 billion, and the
Netherlands €3 billion, while Spain was registering a net gain of more
than €8 billion, Greece almost €4 billion, Portugal about €3 billion and
Ireland about €1 billion, in spite of the spectacular catching-up of the
latter, now third in the per-capita GDP ranking, after Luxemburg and
Denmark1. The fairly massive transfers thus organized via the EU budget
with very little relation to each country’s real income level and ability
to pay had led to the adoption a correction mechanism for the UK in
1984, so that net contributions are more evenly distributed: €6 billion
for Germany, €4 billion for the UK, €3.5 for Italy, €3 for the
Netherlands, and a little less than €3 for France, all other members
except the four net beneficiaries mentioned above being net contrib-
utors too, but for smaller amounts2.
This extreme polarization of net benefits and contributions, which
the new enlargement to relatively poor, and in some cases, agricultural
countries, reinforces, strongly influences the negotiating positions of
national governments, especially in the current context of tight budgets
and difficulties to meet the Stability Pact targets: indeed, given the distri-
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1. In a world of economic openness and globalization, country rankings based on GDP are
not a proper way of approaching notions of fairness or ability to pay, better measured by GNP
or GNI, which only take into account incomes accruing to residents. In the cases of Luxemburg
and Ireland, the gap between the former and the latter is actually quite large (over 20%). This is
also likely to be the case for a number of new member states that are fairly small open economies,
with large fraction of their production sector in the hands of foreign investors.
2. Though, of course, net contributions are, in some cases, large when expressed as a share
of GDP.
bution of current expenditures and the current financing rules, any
increase in the overall size of the budget will lead to larger net contri-
butions by those who already contribute the most. As a reaction to
this state of affairs, and a threat to net beneficiaries, the heads of
governments of the six larger net contributors (Germany, UK, the
Netherlands, France, Sweden and Austria) have, in early January 2004,
sent a letter to the President of the Commission demanding that the
total EU budget be submitted to a tighter ceiling of 1% of GNI in the
next financial perspectives.
In an effort to meet this opposition, accommodate previous commit-
ments, such as the one made by Germany and France in 2002 to
stabilize the total amount spent on agriculture after 2006, and yet obtain
an increase in the size of the budget (to about 1.15% of EU GNI, and
up to the 1.24% of GNI ceiling when including the emergency reserves),
the Commission has, in its programmatic document (EU Commission,
2004), proposed several changes in the budget. Some have to do with
the nature and classification of expenditure items, and may be regarded
as mostly cosmetic3. But the major proposal, in this respect, is a genera-
lized correction formula for net budgetary balances of member states,
that would leave no country with a net contribution larger than what
all would regard as “fair”. Although such an approach may be necessary
to win the support of major net contributors to a larger EU budget, it
also tends to postpone the reflection on better sources of financing
and to institutionalize the notion of “juste retour”, with all the theoretical
objections and practical problems of assessment that may be raised
against it.
2. The track record of major common policies
Within the current structure of the EU budget, two common
policies– the CAP and structural funds– alone absorb almost 80% of
total expenditures. Given their relatively low per-capita incomes and
the structure of their economies, with, in some cases such as Poland,
a very large agricultural sector, new member states also stand to benefit
from these policies, provided their financing and general orientations
are maintained. However, under the pressure to reduce its budgetary
cost and to conform to the new international-trade context, the CAP
has been profoundly restructured over the past twelve years and its
extension to new members has been conducted in a rather restrictive
and progressive manner. Similarly, the rules prevailing for the distribution
of regional and structural funds have been subject to several restric-
tions and are currently under review by the Commission, while a
number of recent studies question their effectiveness in reducing
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3. See below, and Begg, 2004.
regional economic disparities and/or in promoting growth in the EU.
Hence, in spite of the widely spread opinion that these two policies
are likely to retain major shares in the expenditures of the EU budget,
their overwhelming importance is increasingly questioned and some
critics (e.g. Sapir et alii, 2003) even advocate a drastic reduction or
indeed a complete disappearance of these policies from the European
panoply.
2.1. The CAP and its budgetary costs
Long regarded as an intangible part of the “acquis communautaire”,
the CAP has also reaped the lion’s share of the EU expenditures,
reaching more than 75% of total spending in the late 1980s. But the
reforms conducted in 1992, 1999 and again in June 2003 have brought
its budgetary cost under control: currently representing less than 50%
of total expenditures, agricultural spending is supposed, under the
Franco-German compromise of 2002, to remain constant in money
terms from 2006 till 2013.
Conceived in the late 1950s, in the aftermath of World War II that
had brought widespread food shortages back in some European
countries and as a response to the division of Europe by the “Iron
curtain”, that had deprived Germany of her most productive agricul-
tural regions and cut her off from her traditional suppliers, in particular
of wheat, the CAP initially was a policy to boost agricultural production
and to raise farmers’ incomes, in a context where farmers were still a
large fraction of the working population in some countries, and where
living standards in rural areas were markedly less than average. The
major instruments to reach these goals were the “orientation” section
of the European agricultural budget– along with national subsidies– to
encourage modernization, mechanization and restructuring of farming,
on the one hand; and, on the other hand, a system of internal price
support and external protection for major staples, cereals, milk products
and beef, initially. This policy proved remarkably effective in boosting
food supplies and farmers’ incomes in the 1960s and 1970s; it was also
inexpensive for the budget, at least as long as the European Community,
then limited to the six original members, was still a net importer of the
major crops, insofar as the receipts from import levies was a significant
source of revenue for the common budget, and price support was easy
as long as supply fell short of demand4. With the success of this
“productivist” strategy, the net budget cost started to increase, as
import levies vanished and had to be replaced by export subsidies to
get rid of excess supplies and interventions on domestic markets to
store or destroy part of the crops. In the early 1980s, while the
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4. Of course, trade barriers meant that domestic prices were kept artificially above world
levels, so that the main cost was then born by European consumers.
budgetary expenditure on agricultural support was rising, a first reform
was introduced in milk farming, with the adoption of production quotas,
which effectively resulted in the disappearance of excess supply and the
maintenance, for 20 years, of relatively stable prices.
As the budgetary cost of the CAP was still on the rise, and Europe
had become of major exporter of staples– especially wheat– and
processed food, in the 1980s, competing with the US and other tradi-
tional exporters, the GATT Uruguay round, initiated in 1986, decided,
for the first time, to bring international trade in agriculture and food
products into the realm of liberalization and market opening. As a
response, the CAP reform of 1992 started a movement of lowering
internal prices and replacing price support and export subsidies by direct
income maintenance to farmers, initially as a compensation for lower
production prices. This new strategy, which was then pursued in the
Berlin reform of 1999, and generalized in June 2003, was meant to
bring domestic prices in line with world prices, in order to benefit
European consumers and to encourage an expansion of sales, both in
domestic markets and abroad. In practice, although consumers did not
really benefit, the new policy was effective in reducing excess supplies
and controlling the budgetary cost of the CAP, while retaining a
mechanism for farmers’ income support. The latter has been progres-
sively shifted onto two major types of instruments: a small fraction of
expenditures, mostly under the so-called “second pillar” is now used
on instruments to promote environmental protection, animal welfare,
etc., while the bulk of support is in the form of “decoupled” income
subsidies, bearing no direct link with current production, and hence
deemed not to introduce distorsions in prices, hence in decisions to
produce. In the current round of international trade negotiations, in the
realm of the Doha round, the fight against what is left of export
subsidies has been intensified with the argument that they are detri-
mental to farmers in poorer, less developed countries, which is
undoubtedly right; but the more wide ranging attack against public
support of agriculture in rich OECD countries, i.e. essentially the EU
and the US, is probably much more debatable (see Fitoussi and
Le Cacheux, eds., 2003; Laborde and Le Cacheux, 2003).
The new situation created by the successive reforms of the CAP,
which is now mostly geared at farmers’ income support by means of
decoupled subsidies, threatens the rationale of a European agricultural
policy. Indeed, with free markets and the almost complete dismantling
of price support mechanisms– and soon also of production quotas in
milk farming–, the major reasons for having a common policy disappear,
as the policy tools are mostly distributional, and the only shared objec-
tives, such as environmental protection and rural development,
represent only a minor fraction of expenditures, while their common
character may even be questioned.
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With the only partial extension of the benefit of income support
to farmers in the new member states, and with the pursuit of decou-
pling decided in June 2003, when the precise rules for distribution of
farmers’ subsidies were also left in the hands of member states, it may
be argued than the CAP has almost ceased to exist, in spite of a formal
agreement to carry it forward at least until the end of the next medium-
term financial perspectives. Renationalizing agricultural policies, as
advocated by some (e.g. Sapir et alii, 2003) would, in these conditions,
be a logical step. But the new orientations may well introduce less visible
forms of distorsions in competitive positions; and they effectively lead
to a complete free-market approach to agriculture, at a time when
threats to food security and safety, the environment, rural development,
but also expansion of food-processing industries could be regarded as
proper objectives for a renewed approach to agricultural policy in an
enlarged EU. In addition, of course, the modernization and income
support objectives of the initial CAP still retain pertinence in the new
members, especially Poland and, in the next round of enlargement,
Bulgaria and Romania. But in these cases, the fear of having to bear
large budgetary costs and, incidentally, of raising productivity and
competitiveness in agricultural sectors that might then become serious
competitors led to a restrictive approach, opening up the way to
complete renationalization of agricultural policies.
2.2. Cohesion policies, economic convergence,
and the catching-up process
Although their expansion is more recent and their budgetary cost
less than that of the CAP, structural and regional policies, which, if left
unchanged, are to greatly benefit new member states, have also been
increasingly criticized in recent years, and their mere existence has been
questioned too5. Two strands of criticisms have been set forth in recent
years. The first type rests on available empirical evaluations of regional
and structural policies that tend to conclude that they have not been
very effective in promoting the catching-up of poorer regions, and have
therefore not decisively reduced income inequalities amongst regions.
Hence, for instance, Fayolle and Lecuyer (2000) argue that European
funds have helped narrow the average income gaps amongst countries,
and especially benefited Ireland and Spain, but they seem to have failed
to pull poorer regions in poorer countries closer to the average.
Although more recent studies (e.g. Dall’erba and Le Gallo, 2003) reach
more nuanced conclusions, there may indeed be a problem of efficiency
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5. Once again, the most radical attack is to be found in the Sapir Report (2003), which essen-
tially pleads in favor of dismantling the major financial instruments of regional policies, to retain
only the ones meant to compensate for the regional consequences of increased market integration.
See below.
of these policies, either because they are not focused enough and tend
to spread funds over a large array of regions, even those with medium
income levels, or because their rules, in particular the so-called
“additionality condition”, prove more favorable to richer regions, that
benefit from a better capacity to design projects eligible for European
funding and from larger financial resources to match European ones.
However, it may also be the case that these policies take time to effect
economic conditions in the regions, so that, given their relatively recent
expansion6, their consequences on catching-up will only be measurable
in years to come.
A more drastic criticism is developed in the Sapir Report (2003)
which argues that regional and structural policies are, indeed, detri-
mental to overall economic growth, insofar as they contribute to
artificially maintaining economic activities in peripheral regions and thus
prevent agglomeration, which, according to some “new growth theory”
models, is a major factor of efficiency gains. Dismantling the major
instruments of regional policies would therefore result in higher average
economic growth in the EU, which would then benefit all and the
proceeds of which could then, to some extent, be redistributed,
possibly by national governments. However, such a reasoning may be
criticized on several grounds: in particular, first the idea that agglomer-
ation is the best way to maximize overall growth is debatable, and
would have to be subjected to deeper empirical scrutiny; and second,
in a world of second best, objectives other than mere growth
maximization may be equally defendable (see Le Cacheux and
Sterdyniak, 2003).
Notwithstanding these theoretical and empirical considerations, the
current approach to regional and structural policies in the EU is
dominated by purely distributional considerations. The new members,
being all much poorer than former members, all stand to benefit from
existing instruments; but given the size of their income gap, their
benefits have, in the current financial perspectives, been limited to less
than 4% of their GDP. For the new medium-term financial perspec-
tives, the Commission has proposed an extension of existing policies,
with increased funding, that is meant to preserve most of the benefits
of former member states, in order to preserve political support (see,
for instance, Gaillard and Sutour, 2004). But given the expressed will
of net contributors to cap the overall size of the EU budget, choices
will have to be made.
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6. Cohesion funds, currently benefiting the four « cohesion countries » (Greece, Ireland,
Portugal and Spain) have been created as late as 1992, and their resources have been increased
only late in the 1990s. Given the long-term character of many infrastructure projects financed
under this heading, one would not expect visible economic consequences to materialize
immediately.
3. European public goods and common objectives
Rather than focusing the debates on the overall size of the EU
budget or on net contributions of member states, a more constructive
and potentially more fruitful approach would emphasize the common
objectives and possible collective goods that European countries
recognize they are willing to provide, either jointly through the direct
intervention of the EU level via its budget, or indirectly, by inducing
national governments to provide them. The way the Commission has
tried to reformulate common policies and recast the various spending
items in terms of major objectives (essentially competitiveness,
cohesion and external actions, see Table 1) is an interesting attempt in
this direction, although it appears quite artificial and mostly cosmetic in
the Commission document (EU Commission, 2004).
An earlier attempt at this kind of reasoning had been made by the
so-called MacDougall expert group, back in the mid-1970s (EU
Commission, 1977). The study then envisaged various scenarios,
inspired by the experience of existing federations, for the evolution and
overall size of the EU budget. In the most modest scenario, it viewed
an EU budget reaching about 2% of GDP and concentrating on the
financing of a limited number of European public goods or services,
such as a common defense; in other scenarios, it envisaged an expansion
of the common budget to 5 or 6% of GDP, in which case it would
also provide macroeconomic stabilization services.
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Policy heading 2006* 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
1a.  Competitiveness 7.3 9.1 10.4 11.7 12.0 14.1 15.3 16.3 
1b.  Cohesion 32.1 35.6 34.9 34.3 33.6 32.9 32.5 32.2 
2a.  Agriculture 36.2 32.6 41.7 40.6 39.5 38.5 37.5 36.5 
2b. Other ‘sustainable management’ 10.2 10.2 10.3 10.3 10.2 10.1 9.9 9.8 
3.   Citizenship, security, etc. 1.1 1.2 1.5 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.1 2.3 
4.   EU as global partner 9.3 8.5 8.8 9.0 9.4 9.7 9.8 9.9 
5.   Administration 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 
1. Planned expenditure under the 2007-2013 financial perspective 
In % of total budget
* Due to a one-off adjustment made by the Commission in the current structure to make it comparable to the
planned one, this column adds up to a little less than 100%.
Sources: EU Commission, 2004, calculations by Begg (2004).
Of course, the current political situation is quite far from such a
“fiscal federal” approach to EU budget programming. Yet, if one is to
take the idea of common objectives, such as the Lisbon ones, or public
goods, such as a common defense, seriously, it may be worth launching
a new reflection on the appropriate way of promoting these goals: one
way, as explored in the MacDougall report (EU Commission, 1977) is
an increase in the overall size of the EU budget; another way is
presented in the Sapir Report (Sapir et alii, 2003), with an unchanged
overall size of the budget, kept under the 1%-of-GNI limit, along with
a complete overhaul of expenditure items, reallocated to new objec-
tives, such as growth and competitiveness, at the expense of more
traditional ones, such as agricultural support and spatial cohesion. A
third way would consist in rethinking the objectives and trying to
transform the EU budget in a toolbox containing relatively small-sized,
but well-targeted financial incentives to induce national governments to
deliver on commonly agreed collective goods and objectives. This third
approach, which would seem more akin to the current European
integration process, in which centralization is generally regarded as a
trend to be fought, would also promote more ambitious policy objec-
tives, an important ingredient in the aftermath of an enlargement that
seems to have lessened the political integration dimension and on the
eve of a new debate on the project of a constitutional treaty7.
4. A European tax?
Even though it may appear relatively simple, transparent and fair,
insofar as it mostly rests on contributions that are proportional to each
member’s GDP, the current mode of financing the EU budget has
several weaknesses that contribute to emphasize the distributional
dimension in the negotiations. First, the reference taken for calculating
national contributions– GDP– is not an appropriate indicator of the
ability to pay. Second, the national contributions are treated as an
expenditure in the national budgetary process, which clearly individu-
alizes the burden of European duties, administration and policies, giving
the false impression that these expenditures are large. Moreover,
financing the EU budget with national contributions makes it possible,
and indeed relatively easy, to calculate net gains or losses from the
European budget.
Already in the late 1990s, the European Council had asked the
Commission to make proposals for a reform of the EU budget
resources. But no precise proposal had been made in Berlin, at the time
when the previous medium-term financial perspectives– the so-called
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7. For more on this, see Fitoussi and Le Cacheux, eds. (2003). For an alternative way of
thinking about these issues, see also Buti and Nava (2003).
“Agenda 2000”– had been discussed and adopted. The new proposals
of the Commission for the next financial perspectives covering the
2007-2013 do not explicitly recommend a reform of financing sources,
but briefly allude to the possibility of instituting a new mode of financing
by creating a European tax. Long advocated by some (e.g. Sterdyniak
et alii, 1991; Le Cacheux, 2000; EU Commission, 2002), a European
tax would help solving several problems of the EU budget, especially
the lack of political legitimacy, insofar as it would have to be voted by
the European Parliament, a major step on the road towards a tradi-
tional form of democracy.
But which tax then? The Commission cites a genuinely European
VAT, a tax on energy consumption (an eco tax) and a corporate income
tax. In each case, the idea would be to concurrently reduce the national
tax pressure, so that the overall tax burden would not increase. Given
that the last two (eco tax and corporate tax) are currently among the
major instruments in the hands of national governments to engage in
tax competition (see Le Cacheux, 2000), a Europeanization of at least
part of one such tax would ease the problem. It would also be
consistent with the aim of completing the European single market and
ensuring a “level playing field” for European firms, while retaining the
possibility for national governments to levy their own taxes on the same
basis. In addition, financing the EU budget at least partly with the
proceeds of a European tax would also be a way of blurring the calcu-
lation of net gains or losses, as the localization of receipts would be
made almost impossible in most instances. And it would introduce a
double automatic stabilizer mechanism in the EU budget: on the one
hand, total receipts would fluctuate with business conditions, which
would imply either the tolerance of a budget deficit at the EU level or
some compensation formula; on the other hand, the EU budget would
function as a spatial stabilizer, cushioning the effects of macroeconomic
asymmetric shocks much in the same way – though on a smaller scale—
as the federal budget in the US. For the corporate income tax, the
Commission has recently advocated a harmonization of the tax basis,
which could pave the way for a future Europeanization of at least part
of it8. Even though the prospects for such a reform of the EU budget
own resources may appear quite bleak in the present political context,
a deeper reflection on such a move would be most welcome, especially
at a time when the adhesion of new members, most of which are small
and have relatively low business taxation and other production costs,
so that tax competition may become fiercer9.
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8. For a more detailed analysis of various devices and ways of combining European and
national taxations of corporate income, see Sterdyniak et alii, 1991, and EU Commission, 2002.
9. For more detailed arguments about tax competition and the size of countries, see
Le Cacheux, 2000, and Laurent and Le Cacheux, 2004.
5. Concluding remarks
The current debate about the future of the EU budget has, so far,
been cast in purely distributional terms: new members, who stand to
gain from existing policies, mostly insist on prolonging past practices;
members of the EU15, who all stand to lose, either because, like
Germany or, even, France, their already large net contributions are likely
to increase or, like Spain, because their net benefits will be drastically
reduced. Net contributors tend to favor a small budget; net benefici-
aries would like to increase its size; France is in the awkward position
of advocating either a reduction in size, or a selective increase that
would limit her own net contribution by preserving the large benefits
from the CAP or a loosely targeted regional policy. The Commission,
in an effort to conciliate these contradictory demands and because it
is reaching the end of its term, has proposed a modest increase in
overall size, along with a reshuffling of existing expenditures. The
temptation to link these issues with the debate over the double-majority
rule to be adopted in the future constitutional treaty even worsens the
distributional bias.
As long as the EU budgetary debates are viewed as purely zero-
sum games, it seems very unlikely that progress will be made towards
a better use of European funds and other common tools. One way
out of this deadlock has been proposed by the Sapir Report (2003),
which rests on the assumption that agglomeration and promoting
research and development will maximize overall economic growth in
Europe, thus permitting the implementation of some, limited and
precisely targeted redistribution. The underlying rationale is therefore
the transposition at the EU level of the traditional conflict between
efficiency and redistribution. An alternative hypothesis10 would instead
emphasize the positive-sum-game character of at least some common
policies, leading to radically different conclusions about both the
overall size of the budget and about the nature of common policies
and expenditures.
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10. An example of such an approach is discussed, with the help of macroeconomic simula-
tions, in Le Cacheux, ed., 1996.
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